On Wednesday, June 25, two bombs exploded in central Karbala, killing at least 2 and wounding 14.[i] The explosive devices were located minibuses and were targeting major Shi’ite shrines. Unlike previous attacks, however, these bombings do not appear to have been carried out by al-Qaeda in Iraq in an attempt to stoke sectarian violence. Rather, the attacks appear to have been carried out by Moqtada al-Sadr’s newly-renamed “resistance cells,” which appear to be long-existing Iranian-backed cells known as "Special Groups." Sadr recently indicated that these groups exist to “resist the occupation.”  [ii]

Iraqi intelligence officials quoting an Iraqi intelligence report, have stated that Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) is “turning itself into a secret armed organization” in the wake of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s recent offensives against the militia throughout Baghdad and southern Iraq that left over 2,000 JAM fighters dead and caused 1,300 more to flee to Iran.[iii] The intelligence report went on to say that Jaysh al-Mahdi would be finished in its traditional form of a large militia numbering in the tens of thousands; instead, the Sadrist militia will rely on a very small organization of between 150-200 members to undertake attacks in the style of al-Qaeda in Iraq; these attacks would focus on targeting specific individuals for assassination as well as undertaking attacks on US forces.[iv]

This most recent attack fits that pattern, as Jaysh al-Mahdi has chosen to undertake a high-profile attack against civilians instead of attempting to contest control of the local population. Sadr’s militant wing appears to have conceded the population to the Iraqi Government and is no longer attempting to show that it can defeat the Iraqi Security Forces in a head-to-head engagement after its defeats in previous months. Thus, while the attack is a high-profile move, it comes as a result of Sadr’s options being limited.

These attacks have come after several weeks of increased activity that indicate a desire to carry out violent attacks in Karbala, which is home to several major Shi'ite shrines. For example, on June 17, Iraqi police arrested 15 individuals who were attempting to infiltrate the city in order to incite riots and demonstrations against the local Iraqi security forces. .[v]  Later, on June 22, Karbala police arrested three terrorists who were seeking to infiltrate the city and were caught with documents that indicated plans to target religious institutions within the city. [vi]  It seems that these most recent bombings represent the fruition of those planned attacks.

Though it remains to be seen the effect that these bombings will have, on their face attacks serve to intimidate the population and to deliver a message to the attackers' rivals; in that sense, they serve a similar purpose to many of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s high-profile attacks. If the attacks are successful in intimidating the Iraqi public and Iraqi Security Force personnel, they may provide Sadrists with some breathing room to reconstitute themselves in the wake of their recent losses. Similarly, if the Sadrist military offensive kills the right opposition leaders, it may leave Sadr’s opponents in a degree of disarray, allowing that same opportunity for reconstitution.

At the same time, these attacks share some of the same risks as the AQI attacks. First, the attacks against Shi’ite shrines may serve to alienate the local populations and give them a greater incentive to provide intelligence on would-be terrorists in the future and further unravel JAM’s infrastructure. This effect was certainly evident as Sunni civilians turned against al-Qaeda in Iraq and its potential against the Sadrist Trend seems legitimate given the extreme religious importance of the shrines targeted in the attack. Furthermore, much of the public’s toleration for JAM came because it provided protection against attacks by Sunni insurgent groups. In this case, however, the Sadrists are attacking their fellow Shi’a citizens, which is not likely to increase tolerance for Sadrists’ nefarious activities. The potential for a backlash seems to have been borne out one day after the bombings, as there were demonstrations in Karbala supporting the Maliki government's security crackdown in Maysan, which many believe are targeting Sadrists. [vii]

Moreover, the Sadrist Trend’s desire to continue to participate in Iraq’s legitimate political process increases its vulnerability to a popular backlash if these attacks are associated with Sadr, as the Sadrists are attempting to contest the October Provincial elections in southern Iraq. If the continued militant activity undercuts support for Sadrist politicians, there appears a potential for continued fractures within the Sadrist movement and a poor showing in the October elections, both of which would empower Sadr’s political opponents.

[v] “Iraqi FM, Dick Cheney discuss proposed security pact; other Iraqi developments.” Al-Sharqiyah TV. 6/18/2008. Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring

[vi] AE and SR. “3 gunmen planning attacks on Karbala shrines arrested.” Voices of Iraq. 6/23/2008. Available at http://www.aswataliraq.info/look/english/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPubl...

[vii] MH and AM. "Iraqi government support people stance on US-Iraq agreement- governor." Voices of Iraq. 6/26/2008. Available at http://www.aswataliraq.info/look/english/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPubl...

 On June 13, 2008, Liwa Smeisem, a Sadrist parliamentarian, announced that Moqtada al-Sadr had authorized the creation of "cells to resist the occupation."[i]  Upon closer examination, these “resistance cells” appear to be Special Groups cells that the Iranian Qods Force has trained and financed.[ii] Special Groups are often made up members of Sadr’s militia, the Mahdi Army (“Jaysh al-Mahdi”, or JAM) and carried out lethal operations against Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces despite Sadr’s publicly declared cease-fire, which came into effect in late August 2007.
 
Until now, mainstream Sadrist and JAM members Special Groups been denounced as “rogue elements” or “criminals” by mainstream Sadrists and militia members who were attempting to dissociate themselves from the continuing operations, even though Special Groups operated under Sadr’s control.[iii] Sadr’s announcement is therefore not creating any new force, but acknowledging the reality that he does in fact direct Special Groups activity.

It is notable that Sadr explicitly stated that these cells will only be authorized to carry out military action on Coalition Forces rather than Iraqi Security Forces.[iv]  This is important because the two major offensives against Sadrist strongholds –in Basra and Sadr City – have been spearheaded by Iraqi troops with limited Coalition support. Furthermore, Coalition Forces are not found in great numbers in many Sadrist strongholds like Maysan province, Basra, or Sadr City. This means that Sadr will likely target the smaller coalition presences in those areas while also targeting the Iraqi Security Forces whom they regularly fight.

This statement is a further indication that Moqtada al-Sadr and the Sadrist Trend have come under a great deal of pressure from Iraqi Security Forces and are attempting to stake out a . Indeed, the defeat of JAM in Sadr City appears to have undermined some of Moqtada al-Sadr’s popular support as turnout for protests against the Status of Forces Agreement between the United States in Iraq has been quite low.[v] This suggests that Sadr is less capable of harnessing the Sadrist movement to incite disruptions in public life through protests than once thought. This limitation of Sadr’s ability as a popular political leader as well as the Sadrist parliamentarians’ failure to garner sympathy from other Iraqi constituencies has left Sadr with his military option.
 
This announcement means that Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces will continue to target Special Groups networks throughout Iraq, limiting Sadr’s ability to cast himself as a participant in Iraq’s legitimate political process. This appears to have played itself out fully, as Sadr declared that he will not participate in Iraq’s 2008 Provincial Elections while attempting to position himself as the primary opponent to the United States' continued presence in Iraq.

[i] SK. “Shiite cleric Sadr authorizes setting up "resistance cells"-Sadrist.” Voices of Iraq. 6/13/2008. Available at http://www.aswataliraq.info/look/english/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrArticle=82338&NrIssue=2&NrSection=1

[ii] “Al-Sadr: New force to fight U.S. in Iraq.” CNN. 6/13/2008. Available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/13/iraq.alsadr/index.html?iref=mpstoryview

[iii] Paley, Amit. “U.S. Deploys a Purpose-Driven Distinction.” The Washington Post. 5/20/2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/20/AR2008052001716.html

[iv] “Al-Sadr: New force to fight U.S. in Iraq.” CNN. 6/13/2008. Available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/13/iraq.alsadr/index.html?iref=mpstoryview

[v] Roggio, Bill. “Sadr’s Demonstrations Not Doing so Well.” The Weekly Standard – The Blog. 6/13/2008. Available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2008/06/post_26.asp

 
In January 2008, Multi-National Division – North began sponsoring the Musalaha program across certain areas of northern Iraq. Musalaha literally means “reconciliation” and is meant to build on other ongoing reconciliation efforts in Iraq including the Sahwa movement, the Sons of Iraq program, and the Amnesty law passed as part of a legislative package earlier this year. Unlike the Sahwa movement or Sons of Iraq program in which local Iraqis are recruited as security forces, the Musalaha program is simply an exit for fighters who want to come clean and reconcile with the Government of Iraq (GoI) and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
 
Under the Musalaha program, individuals who admit to having attacked only Coalition Forces are essentially given a clean slate. They are screened and required to undergo iris scans and fingerprints. If they pass screening they are offered the opportunity to sign a cease-fire and a pledge to follow all Iraqi laws. Upon release they are monitored and subject to harsh penalties if they return to violence. This process is reinforced by the fact that many of the individuals who participate in the Musahala program are brought in through tribal networks. Their behavior upon release is subsequently tied to tribal ties in their respective local areas, which helps to ensure that they do not break their pledge. The program also offers a fig leaf to those who have conducted attacks against ISF and Iraqi civilians. Individuals in this category remain responsible for their crimes, but are charged through Iraqi courts and offered a “fair” legal process.
 
In general, the increased security across many parts of northern Iraq has provided the foundation for the Musalaha program. As operations have pushed al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other insurgents out of certain areas, security levels have stabilized and residents have come forward to work with ISF and Coalition Forces. The Musalaha program takes advantage of these local level dynamics by then offering residents who may have been involved in attacks a way to reconcile. This process has the potential to create increasing returns to security over time. As reconcilable individuals agree to exit the insurgency, it isolates the remaining irreconcilable insurgents and reduces their recruiting pool and operational capabilities. Moreover, those who do reconcile, often assist ISF and Coalition Forces in finding weapons caches and identifying irreconcilable insurgents. These factors lead to increasing security gains, which in turn spurs more individuals to reconcile.
 
So far more than 1,000 individuals across northern Iraq have come forward to participate in Musalaha. The program has been used effectively as part of Operation Restore Peace in the Hawijah district in Tamim province where violence has been reduced by 80-90% since last year. More recently, a Musalahah program was started in the city of Balad where ISF and Coalition operations have effectively forced insurgents to the table.
 
Balad is located 50 miles north of Baghdad along the southwestern side of the Tigris River and is home to roughly 100,000 residents. It is a mostly Shi’a city, but is surrounded by Sunni villages and lies in the heart of the Sunni triangle. Since the start of the Iraq War, the Balad area has been a center of insurgent activity and in 2006 was highly contested as part of the sectarian conflict that engulfed the country. During 2007 a series of Coalition operations helped clear central Iraq and eliminate insurgent strongholds in places like Balad. A substantial ISF presence in the city has helped maintain security, but insurgents have continued to operate in villages in the surrounding area and occasionally conduct attacks in the city. The Balad area, including the city of Duluiyah northeast of Balad on the opposite side of the Tigris River, is also an important node along the Tigris River Valley corridor and the 2/3 highway that runs from Kirkuk through Diyala province.
 
In the beginning of May, the Musalaha program was expanded to Balad and importantly targeted local tribal leaders in the Sunni villages in the area. Many local residents were initially skeptical of the program, but it has slowly gained credibility. On May 23rd, the program really gained momentum as 140 individuals turned themselves in to the Joint Coordination Center in Balad. In the previous days, Coalition Forces had targeted and killed three key insurgent leaders removing individuals who were intimidating local foot soldiers in the area and demonstrating the continuing resolve of security forces to target insurgents in the area. Ultimately, these kinetic operations, combined with the urging of local tribal leaders, led to non-kinetic successes as 140 individuals agreed to join the Musalaha program.
 
In total, more than 300 individuals have come forward to participate in the Musalaha program in Balad in the month of May. Most of them were screened and released after signing the pledge to follow all Iraqi laws. 76 fell into the second category and are to face Iraqi charges in court. There is also evidence that the reconciliation of these 300 individuals has already led to increased security and greater operational effectiveness in the area. According to Multi-National Forces – Iraq, “The 1st BCT, 101st AD Soldiers in Balad continued to reap the benefits of successful reconciliation over the past several weeks as intelligence tips from local citizens led them to two more caches over the weekend (May 31 – June 1).”
 
The Musalaha program in Balad will hopefully help lead to lasting security gains. Importantly, the local level dynamics in Balad have the potential to radiate outward as the program expands to more villages in the area. This expansion, in turn, has the potential to help secure a key node north of Baghdad and impact the security environment in neighboring areas as well.
 
 
Multi-National Forces – Iraq
Aswat al-Iraq
Kim Gamel, “Some Iraqi Insurgents Agree to Reconcile,” AP, May 23, 2008.

 
After several months of planning, Iraqi Security Forces, with the support of Coalition Forces, launched Operation Lion’s Roar (Za'eer al-Assad) in Mosul on May 10, 2008. The purpose of Lion’s Roar was to target the al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) network and other remaining Sunni insurgent groups in Mosul and Ninawa province. In the first few days of Lion’s Roar, Iraqi Security Forces detained 500 individuals in Mosul, found and cleared multiple weapons caches, and established a series of checkpoints and other permanent security structures across the city. Along with military operations, efforts were also made to begin reconciling Mosul’s diverse population and target areas for reconstruction. On Wednesday May 14th, Prime Minister Maliki flew to Mosul to oversee the beginning of the second phase of operations under Operation Mother of Two Springs (Umm al-Rabiain).*
 
Operation Mother of Two Springs is essentially a continuation of Lion’s Roar. According to Prime Minister Maliki, “the aim of the offensive is to clear Mosul of the criminal terrorist gangs, putting an end to people’s suffering.” Ultimately, “it intends to provide suitable conditions for the operation of state offices, enabling it to reconstruct the city and to deliver services to its people.” Military operations under Mother of Two Springs have continued to target wanted individuals and are concentrated largely in the central areas of Mosul. Iraqi Security Forces are currently attempting to clear contested neighborhoods in central Mosul and establish 24 hour security presences. Some neighborhoods have not seen a security presence in months and establishing 24 hour security through a network of combat outposts has been made a priority. As these central areas become more secure, Iraqi Security Forces will increasingly push out into Mosul’s suburbs and outer lying villages in an effort to dismantle insurgent support areas in Mosul’s belts.
 
Fourteen insurgent groups are currently active in Ninawa province, but the major groups being targeted are AQI, Ansar al Sunna, and Naqshibandis. Since the beginning of operations in Mosul under Lion’s Roar and Mother of Two Springs at least 1,480 individuals have been detained. Approximately 300 of these individuals were wanted by Iraqi Security Forces. According to Major General Mark Hertling, commander of Multi-National Division – North, as of May 16th about 200 tier one and tier two insurgents were detained. These individuals occupy a variety of leadership and mid-level management positions in AQI and affiliated groups, and are involved in IED, VBIED, and suicide bomb attacks, and finance and facilitation. A number of these individuals are high value targets, but have not yet been identified because of intelligence and operational security. More than 40 weapons and explosives caches have also been found and cleared. One cache discovered on May 26th contained “18,000 pounds of homemade explosives, one ton of nitrate, 10 bottles of liquid nitrate, gloves, gas masks, special boots, five-gallon drums, several barrels, 100 kilograms of ball-bearings, 500 grams of gun powder and various unknown materials."
 
Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition Forces have faced almost no opposition since the beginning of operations on May 10th. In total, attacks in Mosul have declined from an average of 40 a day in the week prior to the official launch of operations to between 4 and 6 a day in the weeks after – a roughly 85% decrease in attacks. Some insurgents have been detained, others have gone to ground, and still others have fled the Mosul area. Attacks may increase slightly in the coming weeks as AQI regroups in fringe areas and attempts to penetrate Mosul and other urban areas like Talafar and Sinjar with VBIED and suicide bombing attacks.
 
As part of operations in Mosul, Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition Forces have been actively blocking escape routes from the area and conducting operations south and west of the city to disrupt insurgent activity and target individuals that may have fled. These areas include the Jazeera desert region west and southwest of Mosul, the cities along the line leading down to northern Salah ad Din province, and the Za’ab triangle west and southwest of Kirkuk. A number of individuals have been detained in these areas including Abdel Khaleq Awad al-Sabawi who is believed to be AQI’s security emir for Ninawa province. Al-Sabawi was detained near Tikrit on May 18th. According to Major General Hertling, a number of detained individuals have also revealed where they were before Mosul and this is helping develop an intelligence picture as to where others who flee the operations may go.
 
Operation Mother of Two Springs ultimately aims to move forward reconciliation efforts and the political process in Mosul and Ninawa. Laying the groundwork for these initiatives, Prime Minister Maliki announced on May 16th a limited amnesty for those who turned in their weapons in ten days. Prime Minister Maliki and other administration officials have also attempted to reach out to local tribes and former Iraqi Army personnel to try to reconcile the communities that have provided sanctuaries and recruiting pools for the insurgency in the past. Several tribes in the area have expressed interest in forming Sahwa movements. Formal Sahwa movements in Mosul are unlikely, but the coming weeks and months may see comparable efforts to bring local tribes into the political and security structures in Mosul and Ninawa. As part of this process, Major General Riyadh, head of the Ninawa Operations Command, has been given the authority to recruit several thousand local citizens to join the security forces in some capacity in order to help secure the city in the aftermath of major operations.
 
At root, Mosul’s problems remain political. Reconciliation is the first step in easing these political problems. In the coming months it will be important to reestablish a balance between Mosul’s various groups in order to undercut AQI’s sanctuaries and recruiting pool among disaffected Sunni Arabs in the city. Most importantly, the prime minister has stressed the importance of upcoming provincial elections. Many Sunni Arabs boycotted the 2005 elections and participation this fall can hopefully help bring them into the political process in Ninawa. The Government of Iraq (GoI) will also now focus on regaining control over Ninawa province and integrating it into Iraq’s federal governing structure. Political parties have been asked to vacate government offices in Mosul and a concerted effort will now hopefully be made to re-staff federal offices in order to establish a GoI presence in the city and connect it to the federal government. A similar effort is currently underway in Basra. Connecting these southern and northern centers to Baghdad will be important measures of the GoI’s ability to govern effectively over the coming months.
 
Mosul also suffers from massive unemployment and has been destroyed by years of fighting. Accordingly, reconstruction projects and reestablishing a normal functioning economy will be critical tasks in the coming months. As a first step, Prime Minister Maliki announced on May 17th a $100 million dollar reconstruction package for Mosul to coincide with ongoing military operations. The prime minister’s envoy, Zuheir al-Janabi, arrived in Mosul on May 29th to deliver and oversee the spending of this money. It will be needed to help rebuild roads and buildings, and restore public services to the local population. Some of these things have already begun to happen. On May 20th, the Al Hurriya Bridge, one of the five bridges that spans the Tigris River and connects west and east Mosul, was reopened after being closed to traffic for more than a year. And the following day Mosul’s mayor toured the Zanjili neighborhood, the site of the massive January 25th explosion that collapsed multiple apartment buildings, and targeted it as an area where a municipality office will be established and public works projects will be provided.
 
Together, Operations Lion’s Roar and Mother of Two Springs have begun the arduous process of establishing security in Mosul and Ninawa province. As security operations proceed, the GoI is simultaneously working to promote reconciliation and political participation among the province’s diverse groups, and to begin reconstructing Mosul’s infrastructure and rehabilitating the local economy. This massive undertaking will take at least several months and will be an important test for both Iraqi Security Forces and the GoI. 
 
 
*The name Mother of Two Springs is derived from Mosul’s lengthy spring seasons, which are said to last as long as two springs.
 
(Multi-National Forces – Iraq, Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable, Aswat al-Iraq, Associated Press, Agence France-Presse)

 
The fight for Mosul began to take shape in December 2007. Since that time Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces have prepared for a larger offensive in Mosul and the surrounding areas of Ninawa province. Additional Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces were shifted to Mosul; the Ninawa Operations Command (NOC) was established under Major General Riyadh Jalal Tawfiq; and preparatory operations were conducted in the western, southeastern, and northern sections of Mosul, as well as south of the city and to the west along the line that runs through Talafar and Sinjar to the Syrian border. These developments are documented as part of a comprehensive overview of the fight for Mosul in Backgrounder #31.
 
On Saturday, May 10, 2008, the fight for Mosul transitioned to a new stage with the launch of Operation Lion’s Roar. Operations in Mosul have gradually increased since December, but the announcement of Lion’s Roar likely indicates a further increase in the tempo of operations as part of a more comprehensive strategy to secure Mosul and Ninawa. The primary focus of Lion’s Roar is the AQI network and the remnants of other Sunni insurgent groups. The operation is being led by the NOC under Major General Riyadh who is coordinating the efforts of Iraqi Army, Police, and Border Enforcement units throughout the province.  Three Coalition battalions and a small number of Special Operations Forces are also participating in a support and advisory role. The main effort, however, is Iraqi-led. According to a spokesman from Multi-National Forces – Iraq, “This is their operation. It was conceived and led by the Iraqi military.” 
 
Major General Riyadh has also appealed to former Iraqi Army personnel to help hunt down AQI members. In the last few months more than 1,000 former soldiers have been recruited into the security forces in Mosul. Continuing to court this large and important constituency, which has served as a recruiting ground and offered sanctuary for the insurgency, will be important for establishing security in Ninawa. The Government of Iraq (GOI) and the NOC have also worked to recruit many of the local tribes in and around Mosul. According to BBC News, some 10,000 of these tribesmen are now actively participating in Lion’s Roar.
 
In the days before the official start of the operation a list of AQI targets was drawn up and warrants were issued for their arrest by the Iraqi judicial system. Beginning on the night of Friday May 9, 2008, an indefinite province-wide curfew was announced barring any non military vehicles from transiting roads. Early Saturday morning, hundreds of police and army checkpoints were set up across Mosul and Iraqi Security Forces began conducting raids in targeted areas across the city. A blackout on security developments was imposed at the start of the operation, but at least 96 wanted individuals were detained, as well as 32 others, and 2 weapons caches were found and cleared on Saturday and Sunday. More detailed information will become available as the operation unfolds.
 
AQI will not fight pitched battles, but will instead resort to using improvised explosive devices (IED), vehicle-borne IEDs, suicide bombers and hit and run tactics. AQI insurgents may also simply lay low or move on to other areas in northern Iraq. Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces will be active west and south of Mosul to prevent insurgents from escaping the area, and efforts have been coordinated with forces down in Bayji, Tikrit, and Kirkuk to prevent insurgents from moving further south to the Za’ab triangle or northern Salah ad Din province.
 
Lion’s Roar and possible follow-on operations will likely take several months.   This operation presents an opportunity for the Iraqi Security Forces to take the lead in establishing security in Iraq. After initial setbacks in Operation Charge of Knights in Basra, Iraqi Security Forces have begun to turn that city around. The fight for Mosul will prove whether or not some of the lessons learned in Basra have been internalized. Lion’s Roar will be a critical test for whether or not the Iraqis can shift forces and military assets, and plan, prepare for, and execute security operations. If successful, Lion’s Roar will continue to break the back of the Sunni insurgency and clear the way for Coalition Forces to continue to draw down. 
 
 
(Aswat al-Iraq, al-Sharqiyah, al-Iraqiyah, al-Arabiya, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, The Independent, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, BBC News, United Press International, Multi-National Forces – Iraq, May 10-12, 2008)